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Summary 
Cap-and-trade programs for air emissions have become the widely accepted, preferred 
approach to cost-effective pollution reduction. One of the important design questions in a trading 
program is how to initially distribute the emissions allowances. Under the Acid Rain program 
created by Title IV of the Clean Air Act, most emissions allowances were distributed to current 
emitters on the basis of a historic measure of electricity generation in an approach known as 
grandfathering. Recent proposals have suggested two alternative approaches: allocation according 
to a formula that is updated over time according to some performance metric in a recent year (the 
share of electricity generation or something else) and auctioning allowances to the highest 
bidders. 
Prior research has shown that the manner in which allowances for carbon dioxide (CO2) 
are initially distributed can have substantial effects on the social cost of the policy as well as on 
who wins and who loses as a result of the policy. Another concern with a regional cap-and-trade 
program like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the effect that different 
approaches to allocating emissions allowances will have on the level of CO2 emissions outside 
the region, commonly called emissions leakage. 
In this research we model historic, auction, and updating approaches to allowance 
allocation that we call bookends, then model various variations on these approaches. We consider 
changes in measures such as electricity price, the mix of generation technologies, and the 
emissions of conventional pollutants inside and outside the RGGI region. We examine the social 
cost of the program, measured as the change in economic surplus, which is the type of measure 
used in benefit–cost analysis. We also examine the effects of different approaches to distributing 
allowances on the net present value of generation assets inside and outside the RGGI region. 
We find that how allowances are allocated has an effect on electricity price, consumption, 
and the mix of technologies used to generate electricity. Electricity price increases the most with 
a historic or auction approach. Coal-fired generation in the RGGI region decreases under all 
approaches but decreases the most under updating. Gas-fired generation decreases under historic 
and auction approaches but increases substantially under updating. Renewable generation 
increases under historic and auction approaches but decreases slightly under updating as a 
consequence of the expanded generation from gas. Consistent with the changes in the 
composition of generation, the decline in emissions of conventional pollutants including sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury that was expected as a result of the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule is accelerated substantially as a result of the RGGI policy, particularly under 
updating. The cost of complying with SO2, NOx, and mercury rules declines similarly. 
We find that the social costs of the bookend auction and historic approaches are 
comparable and that the social cost of updating is roughly three times that of the other 
approaches. At the same time, updating yields greater emissions reductions on a national basis 
(because it produces less emissions leakage) and greater cumulative reductions in emissions at the 
national level than historic allocation. Varying the design of the updating approach can reduce its social costs but generally would increase leakage at the same time. An updating approach with 
allocation to all generators, including all nuclear and renewables has the lowest social cost within 
the RGGI region of any policy analyzed, although this result comes at the expense of costs 
imposed outside the region. 
When the approaches to allocation are mixed, we find the changes in electricity price, 
generation, and emissions are roughly a combination of the performance of each individual 
approach. In particular, social costs typically are lower under the scenarios that combine an 
auction with updating than when updating is the exclusive approach to distributing allowances. 
Who wins and who loses from the policy varies with the approach to allocation. Under a 
historic approach, producers in the RGGI region gain substantially and generally are better off 
than without the program; such is not true under an auction or updating. Producers also gain 
overall from the policy when a historic allocation is combined with an auction, but the gains are 
substantially less than in the 100% historic case. Producers outside the region tend to benefit 
considerably from the higher electricity price in the RGGI region but benefit the least under 
updating because the effect on electricity price is lowest. 
Consumers both inside and outside the RGGI region are adversely affected under all 
allocation approaches but much less so under updating because the change in electricity price is 
lowest. One exception is when eligibility for allowances under an updating allocation is limited to 
nonemitters only, in which case the electricity price increases substantially. 
Different types of generators fare differently under the various allocation approaches. 
Asset values for all types of generators are highest under a historic approach, although the 
difference between historic and auction approaches is small for nuclear generators. Compared 
with the baseline, both nuclear and existing gas-fired generators in the RGGI region gain under an 
auction. Only gas-fired generators gain under the bookend approach to updating, although nuclear 
generators benefit as well under updating designs that include them among those eligible for 
allowances. Coal-fired generators lose the most under updating. 
Moving from 100% updating to auctioning an increasingly larger share of allowances 
generally has a positive effect on asset values for all fuel types including coal. The one exception 
is that moving from 50% auction and 50% updating to 100% auction has a negative effect on the 
asset values for coal. 
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses with higher natural gas prices and constraints on 
electricity transmission capability. The social cost of the RGGI program does not appear to be 
sensitive to these constraints. Higher gas prices or transmission constraints alone impose 
significant costs that are larger than the effect of adding the RGGI policy. For example, their 
substantial effect on electricity price is greater than the added effect imposed by the RGGI 
program. The constraints that are modeled do not appear to have a strong impact on RGGI 
implementation. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis with renewables portfolio standard 
policies in place throughout the region. The resulting prices of electricity and CO2 emissions 
allowances are slightly lower than without the renewables policy. 
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 Allocation of CO2 Emissions Allowances in the Regional  
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program 
Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, and Danny Kahn∗
1. Introduction 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is an effort by nine Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic states to develop a regional, mandatory market-based cap-and-trade program to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The effort was initiated formally in April 2003 when Gov. 
George Pataki of New York sent letters to governors of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states. 
Each of the nine participating states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) has assigned staff to a working 
group that is charged with developing a proposal in the form of a model rule by 2005. Initially, 
the program will address carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the electric power sector. If 
successful, the program could serve as a model for a national cap-and-trade program for GHG 
emissions. 
One of the most important and contentious features of an emissions trading program is 
how emissions allowances are initially distributed. Several distribution approaches have been 
considered in other regulatory contexts. One such approach is to distribute allowances on the 
basis of historic measures of electricity generation; this approach is often called grandfathering 
because it distributes allowances without charge to incumbents in the industry. Another approach 
is to regularly update the calculation underlying the allowance distribution based on current- or 
recent-year data. Like distribution based on historic data, an updating approach distributes 
allowances free of charge and also could distribute according to various measures, such as the 
share of electricity generation, emissions, or heat input (related to fuel use) at a facility. The 
primary alternative to these free distribution approaches is the sale of allowances through an 
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auction, directly or indirectly (e.g., allowances may be distributed for free to third parties such 
as energy consumers or their trustees, which then sell allowances through an auction). A key 
feature distinguishing types of auction approaches is the dispensation of revenues raised under 
the auction. Revenues could be returned to industry or consumers, used to compensate 
communities, invested in energy conservation, or used to offset other needs for tax revenue by 
government. 
Each of these approaches has proponents, and each has a precedent. The most well 
known emissions cap-and-trade program—the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions trading program 
initiated under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments—distributes allowances primarily on the 
basis of a historic measure of generation (heat input) at electricity-generating facilities. The 
second-largest U.S. emissions trading program is the nitrogen oxides (NOx) regional cap-and-
trade program in 19 eastern states. Under this program, distribution is determined at the state 
level. Most states use some historic measure as a basis for distribution, but states also use 
updating for some portion of the allowances. Updating is also evident in one form in Sweden, 
where beginning in 1992 the revenues from a tax on NOx emissions were recycled to industry on 
the basis of each emitter’s share of electricity generation.1 Auctioning has a precedent in the state 
of Virginia, which distributed a small portion of its NOx allowances in the regional cap-and-trade 
program through a revenue-raising auction. Recent legislative proposals for the regulation of 
multiple pollutants from the electricity sector also have involved all three of these basic 
approaches to various degrees. 
There is little evidence comparing the experience with different approaches to initial 
allowance distribution, but several theoretical and policy studies have examined efficiency and 
distributional issues. These studies have examined various pollutants, and their findings differ 
somewhat depending on which pollutant is modeled. Moreover, an important distinction is that 
the RGGI policy is aimed specifically at a nine-state region of the country. The RGGI region has 
its own mix of technologies for electricity generation that have a direct bearing on the evaluation 
of the approaches to distributing allowances. The region is characterized by competition in retail 
electricity markets, setting it apart from the nation as a whole, which has a mix of regulation. 
Also, open state borders and the electricity transmission grid pose challenges to policy 
enforcement. Any environmental policy that increases costs in the region is likely to cause some 
emissions leakage to outside the region as economic activity or electricity generation moves to 
                                                 
1 Hoglund (2000); Sterner and Hoglund (2000). 
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avoid regulation. It is noteworthy that the Northeast faces higher natural gas and electricity 
prices than other parts of the nation. 
Two major types of issues affect the choice of a mechanism for distributing allowances in 
the RGGI region. Distributional issues affect consumers vis-à-vis producers through electricity 
price changes and affect various producers in different ways through changes in the valuation of 
generation assets. Economic efficiency issues—the cost-effectiveness of the program within the 
electricity sector—affect everyone. We do not consider secondary costs imposed outside the 
electricity sector due to changes in electricity price or fuel prices. 
1.1. Project Goals 
The questions that we sought to address in this research are the implications of different 
approaches to the initial distribution of CO2 allowances. 
•  What are the effects on the costs of the program? We note that cost—and other 
indicators of efficiency—can be measured in various ways. 
•  What are the distributional consequences? Attention can be focused on distribution 
between consumers and producers or among producers that have a diverse set of 
interests with various portfolios of generation technologies. 
•  How effective are allocation methodologies that favor certain technologies (including 
energy conservation technologies) on the consumer side of the meter, and what are 
the trade-offs? 
•  Would combinations of auctioning (or “grandfathering to consumers,” a form of 
auctioning) and no-cost allocation compensate companies but still provide for an 
efficient outcome? 
In the course of the research, additional questions surfaced that also are discussed below. 
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1.2. Summary of Findings 
In brief, we find that 
•  The CO2 allowances created by the program have a value that is at least four times as 
large as the social cost of mitigation, suggesting that allowance distribution is a 
potentially important source of compensation. 
•  Because of electricity deregulation in the Northeast, allowance value is reflected in 
electricity price to an equal degree for auction and historic approaches to distribution. 
•  The social costs of auction and historic approaches are similar. However, producers 
gain substantially under a historic approach, and in the aggregate, they are better off 
than without the program. 
•  Updating yields a higher allowance price, a lower electricity price, and more 
electricity generation in the RGGI region than the other approaches. 
•  The social cost of an updating approach is about three times greater than that of an 
auction or a historic approach. 
•  The effect on producers is measured by the change in the market value of generation 
assets. Under the historic approach, the market value of all types of generation assets 
gain substantially, and in the aggregate, the industry gains substantially. 
•  Under an auction, the market value of coal assets falls substantially, but in the 
aggregate, the industry is not affected dramatically. 
•  The market value of coal assets—and of all assets in the aggregate—fall by the 
greatest margin under an updating approach. 
•  Coal-fired generation falls under all approaches but falls the most under updating. 
•  Gas-fired generation falls under historic and auction approaches but increases 
substantially under updating. 
•  Leakage of CO2 emissions to outside the RGGI region is greatest under historic and 
auction approaches and lowest under updating. 
•  Emissions of conventional pollutants in the RGGI region fall substantially under all 
approaches to allocation but fall the most under updating. 
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•  The cost of complying with SO2, NOx, and mercury rules falls considerably within the 
RGGI region because of efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. 
•  Varying the approach to updating (including who is eligible to receive allowances) 
can yield very different results. One approach, updating allocation to all generators, 
has the lowest social cost within the RGGI region of any policy analyzed. However, 
the benefit comes at the expense of costs imposed outside the region. 
•  Combined approaches generally lead to intermediate outcomes. 
•  In the aggregate, variations in baseline assumptions such as higher natural gas prices 
or transmission capability constraints tend to benefit producers in the absence of the 
RGGI policy. These constraints have a substantial effect on electricity price that is 
greater than the added effect imposed by the RGGI program. 
•  The cost of the RGGI program does not appear to be sensitive to the price of natural 
gas or the existence of constraints on electricity transmission capability. 
•  The existence of a renewable portfolio standards (RPS) policy causes the CO2 
allowance price to fall slightly. Coal generation remains at a level that is greater than 
in the absence of the RPS, and gas generation falls to a lower level. 
1.3. Conceptual Background 
Allowance distribution is one of the most contentious issues policymakers face when 
designing a cap-and-trade program. Allowances are a valuable asset, and their distribution has 
implications for both equity and efficiency. Many economists and other analysts advocate 
auctioning allowances rather than distributing them at no cost. The benefits of auctioning include 
providing a source of revenue that could potentially address inequities brought about by a carbon 
policy (e.g., by compensating consumers for high prices or communities that are severely 
affected) or be used to make investments in energy conservation. Alternatively, the revenues 
from auctioning allowances may have economy-wide efficiency benefits if they are used to 
reduce taxes. 
In contrast, companies participating in a cap-and-trade program usually oppose auctions. 
They argue that because they already bear the costs of emissions reduction obligations, they 
should not also have to purchase the emissions allowances up front. The net cost to producers of 
the emissions trading program depends on the difference between the change in producer 
revenue and the change in cost. Regardless of how allowances are distributed, firms are expected 
to pass along some of the resource cost associated with reducing emissions and some of the 
5 Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
opportunity cost (market value) of emissions allowances in product prices, thereby causing 
revenues to increase. The justification for the free distribution of emissions allowances is to 
reduce the change in costs for industry and thereby provide compensation. An auction does not 
provide this form of compensation because it makes firms pay for allowances. 
The degree to which producers pass on (in electricity prices) the resource and allowance 
costs varies with the presence or absence of price regulation and with the technology that sets 
marginal cost in competitive regions. In the case of nationwide CO2 regulation, Burtraw et al. 
(2002) find that the free allocation of emissions allowances can dramatically overcompensate the 
electricity industry in the aggregate, although different parts of the industry are affected very 
differently. In the case of SO2, Bovenberg et al. (2003) also find that free allocation as 
envisioned under the Bush administration proposal for SO2 control would overcompensate 
industry. A central issue for RGGI planners is whether the free allocation of CO2 emissions 
allowances in the Northeast provides a level of compensation that is proximate to or potentially 
surpasses (perhaps by a significant degree) compliance costs. 
Recent research also has shown that the initial distribution of allowances can affect the 
economic cost of the policy as well as who wins and loses. Two separate bodies of literature 
have developed with regard to the economic costs or general efficiency issues related to trading 
programs for emissions permits. One explores the role of preexisting distortions away from 
economic efficiency in labor and capital (factor) markets due to the presence of taxes on labor or 
capital income (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, Parry 1995) and relies primarily on computable 
general equilibrium simulation models to estimate the potential efficiency consequences of 
different approaches to allocation (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, Goulder et al. 1997, Goulder et 
al. 1999, Parry et al. 1999, Smith et al. 2002). Cap-and-trade programs for CO2, SO2, and NOx 
have been analyzed in competitive product markets (electricity regulation is not considered 
explicitly), and results favor an auction as the most efficient approach to the initial distribution of 
emissions allowances when the revenues are used to reduce preexisting taxes. We do not 
consider these issues in this paper. 
The second body of literature, to which this paper contributes, examines the role of 
preexisting distortions away from economic efficiency in product markets (such as electricity) 
due to the difference between price and marginal cost, a condition that is common throughout the 
economy and endemic in the electricity sector. In the case of CO2, an auction approach to 
distributing emissions allowances results in a substantially lower social costs than an updating 
approach based on output or a historic approach (Burtraw et al. 2001, 2002; Beamon et al. 2001). 
This result is largely attributable to the fact that electricity prices are set by cost-of-service 
regulation in much of the country, and these prices differ from marginal cost. In regulated 
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regions, the opportunity cost of an emissions allowance given to a firm for free under an 
updating or a historic approach is not directly reflected in the electricity price (i.e., it is valued at 
an original cost of zero). However, the cost of an auctioned allowance is reflected in regulated 
electricity prices, and this cost can widen or narrow the gap between regulated prices and 
efficient prices. Typically, though, it tends to narrow the gap between price and marginal cost 
and improves economic efficiency. 
In the RGGI region, however, electricity markets are deregulated, and retail prices are 
based on marginal costs rather than regulated average cost of service. In this case, the previous 
literature suggests there is little difference between auction and historic approaches to 
distributing allowances from an efficiency perspective. In one case, the revenues go to 
government; in the other, they go to industry. However, because investment and compliance 
behavior are expected to be nearly identical, so is the change in electricity price. In competitive 
electricity markets, an updating approach is expected to have greater social costs than an auction 
or a historic approach because it does not provide the same incentive through higher prices for 
consumers to improve the energy efficiency of energy use. 
In addition to distributional and efficiency effects, a third measure that also may 
distinguish approaches to allocation is the creation of incentives for the introduction of new or 
cleaner technology (Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. 2003). An updating approach 
provides generators with an incentive to increase generation by all sources because of the 
implicit output subsidy, whereas dirty sources are penalized in terms of variable costs due to the 
cost of allowances. In the case of CO2, Burtraw et al. (2002) find updating leads to substantially 
more generation with natural gas and less with coal. 
Another issue of central interest to the RGGI is the leakage of electricity generation, CO2 
emissions, and economic activity to outside the RGGI region. For instance, leakage could result 
if electricity generators decide to use power plants outside the region to generate more electricity 
to be imported into the region over the transmission grid. Leakage could also occur if electricity 
customers decide to self-generate rather than purchase electricity off the grid in response to 
increased electricity price. Previous analysis suggests that the method of distributing emissions 
allowances can have an effect on the degree of leakage and ultimately on the cost-effectiveness 
of the emissions trading program. 
2. Research Strategy 
We use a model that has a high level of detail about technology and institutions to 
calculate investment and dispatch of generation capacity in the electricity sector. The model 
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projects changes in the economic behavior of consumers and producers in response to the climate 
policy and other changes that result from those behavioral responses. 
Point estimates of changes in key variables such as electricity price, electricity 
consumption, and producer profits are reported, but the main focus of this exercise is the changes 
that are predicted to result from baseline in response to variations in the policy design. The 
RGGI staff working group is planning a detailed modeling exercise using the Integrated Planning 
Model (IPM) at a greater level of detail and with greater precision regarding assumptions about 
the future of the electricity industry in the region and the design of the CO2 policy and other 
regional policies. Our model simulations are expected to produce results very close to those of 
the more comprehensive effort, as they are conducted with the same general assumptions. We do 
not adopt the precise assumptions of the RGGI modeling group, partly because of the expense 
involved and also because we aim to characterize the landscape of qualitative considerations 
with more model runs than we could afford otherwise. For example, two key differences include 
our lack of modeling of rules governing transmission that could mitigate leakage and our lack of 
modeling of recent renewable policies in the Northeast. Our simulation model provides a 
laboratory for examining a wide range of options as well as the variations among these options 
while preserving the important quantitative and qualitative differences of the different options, 
which can then be validated in IPM. 
We solve the model for a baseline scenario (described below) through 2025. Then, in 
policy scenarios, we introduce the RGGI and vary the approach to the initial distribution of 
emissions allowances. Results are reported first for three distinct approaches that represent 
“bookends” for the type and mix of approaches that have been widely discussed. The analysis of 
bookend policies provides a useful pedagogy for understanding the trade-offs among approaches. 
Subsequently, we investigate several variations on the bookend approaches, mixed approaches, 
and changes in the baseline parameters. 
The level of aggregation in the model has both strengths and limitations. It is appropriate 
for estimating costs from a social and regional perspective and for understanding the distribution 
of costs between consumers and producers. The model also captures differentiation among fuels 
and technologies and the effects of policies on the market value of existing and new generation 
assets. The effect on existing assets can be aggregated to represent the portfolio owned by firms 
and thereby to provide a good measure of how shareholders are affected. However, the model 
does not capture some short-run idiosyncrasies that affect individual plants such as take-or-pay 
fuel contracts. Intra-regional transmission bottlenecks that may cause a spread between the 
regional high and low electricity prices are not reflected in the model. However, to the extent 
such constraints are observed, they are represented—albeit somewhat imprecisely—through out-
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of-merit-order dispatch and must-run constraints, which are captured with a shadow price 
component of variable costs that is calibrated to approximate actual operation in recent years. 
The model also does not capture the effects of long-term contracts for electricity 
generation from nuclear plants and some fossil fuel–fired units. In several RGGI states, when 
nuclear and other plants were divested by the local integrated utility, the distribution utility 
signed long-term contracts for much of the generation from those facilities. These contracts limit 
the ability of certain generating units to profit from increases in the short-term market price of 
electricity resulting from a RGGI policy. However, in a post-transition competitive market, the 
contracts do not limit the electricity retailer’s ability to charge a price based on the marginal cost 
of electricity sold in shorter-term markets, because the retailer that has purchased power under a 
long-term contract with a generator could turn around and sell that power in the spot market, 
where the RGGI policy could be raising costs of the marginal generator. Therefore, the spot 
market price defines the opportunity cost of selling power to retail customers, and electricity 
retailers (not explicitly represented in our model) will profit from the RGGI policy at the expense 
of those generators that have their power committed for sale under long-term contracts. Thus, in 
a competitive market, the existence of long-term contracts for wholesale power will affect which 
producers and retail suppliers profit from the RGGI policy but will not affect consumer costs. 2
Finally, this study does not investigate the issue of leakage in detail. We find evidence 
that the approach to the initial distribution of emissions allowances affects leakage, but we do not 
offer a systematic analysis. Also, we do not compare the impact of allocation methods with other 
factors, such as the level of the cap. We do explore alternative natural gas prices in a sensitivity 
analysis. 
2.1. Modeling Scenarios 
The model is solved for a baseline, and policy scenarios are analyzed relative to measures 
in the baseline. We describe the central case baseline first. Later, we vary baseline assumptions 
about natural gas prices and transmission capability in a sensitivity analysis. 
                                                 
2 Electricity retailers will be constrained from passing on wholesale market price increases resulting from the RGGI 
policy during the transition period if retail prices are effectively capped or if prices are set based on the weighted 
average of prices for different term contracts for power, as is done for default power in several RGGI states. Our 
analysis is about the longer-term effects of RGGI on electricity prices and not effects during the transition period. 
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2.1.1. Central Case Baseline 
Throughout this analysis, we make several assumptions about underlying policies—
federal and state environmental policies as well as market regulatory policies—that affect the 
performance of electricity generators. In the baseline case, we assume electricity generators face 
requirements under the Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call; Title IV of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments; and the Bush administration’s draft Clean Air Interstate 
Rule (CAIR) for SO2, NOx, and associated mercury. The seasonal NOx SIP Call for 19 eastern 
states is in force for the 2008 simulation and replaced by the annual NOx constraint for a 28-state 
region under CAIR for the other simulation years.3 The annual emissions constraints for SO2 are 
drawn from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) modeled solution for how the 
regional CAIR rule would interact with the national Title IV regulation. Regional annual SO2 
allowance distributions are capped at 3.9 million tons beginning in 2010 and 2.7 million tons 
beginning in 2015. Actual emissions will be higher over the modeling time horizon because of 
the allowance bank. We follow EPA modeling of the SO2 CAIR and Title IV within one national 
trading regime. A single national region is characterized using model results that account for the 
opportunity to use Title IV allowances within the CAIR region at an offset ratio that changes 
over time.4 The actual emissions caps that we model are reported in Table 1. 
Under CAIR, regional annual NOx emissions distributions are capped at 1.6 million tons 
beginning in 2010 and 1.3 million tons beginning in 2015. In the model, the NOx caps include an 
adjustment of about 331,000 tons for units outside the CAIR NOx region but within the Mid-
Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) and New England electricity regions. 
The national annual allocation of mercury emissions allowances is to be capped at 34 tons 
beginning in 2010 and 15 tons beginning in 2018. We model a cap-and-trade program for 
mercury. We adopt as our mercury emissions cap EPA’s prediction of annual emissions in the 
presence of a $35,000/pound ceiling on the price of mercury permits and the ability to bank 
allowances. Under the cap-and-trade programs for the three conventional pollutants, emissions 
allowances are distributed on a historic basis. 
                                                 
3  The 28 states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
4 Docket OAR-2002-0056-0338. 
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We include all announced new source review (NSR) settlements in our technical 
assumptions about emissions control at existing generators.5 We also include a representation of 
two federal policies to promote renewables. We assume that the renewable energy production 
credit (for dedicated biomass and wind generation) is extended. Additionally, we incorporate a 
perpetual 10% investment tax credit for new geothermal resources. 
We also include several state-level environmental and renewables policies. To capture the 
anticipated effects of compliance with state-level RPS and other state-level renewables policies 
and programs (including green pricing on investment in new renewables), we incorporate the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) estimates of several new renewable resource 
investments to be put into place to comply with these policies. In the Northeast, we include 
policies in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.6 However, we do not include policies in 
Maine, New York, Rhode Island, Maryland, or Pennsylvania in our central baseline case or 
policy cases. We expect that in the baseline scenario (e.g., in the absence of the RGGI policy) 
these policies could reduce emissions, CO2 allowance price, investment in gas-fired generation, 
incremental compliance cost, and leakage. We conduct a sensitivity analysis of the baseline and 
historic bookend cases to identify the effects of including the RPS policies in one of the RGGI 
policy cases. The emissions reductions in our model could therefore be thought of as a more 
stringent policy on CO2 because emissions reductions are greater than in the baseline scenario. 
We also include the anticipated effects of state-level multipollutant policies in Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.7
We assume that electricity prices are set competitively in six North American Electric 
Reliability Council (NERC) regions (New York, New England, Mid-Atlantic states [MAAC], 
Illinois area [MAIN], the Ohio Valley [ECAR], and Texas [ERCOT]) and that there is time-of-
day pricing of electricity for industrial customers in these regions. In all other regions of the 
                                                 
5 NSR settlements are those that electricity generating companies have reached with the federal government to bring 
their plants into compliance with NSR requirements for emissions reductions that the government claims were not 
met by past investments at specific facilities. 
6 We also include the effects of state-level RPS policies in Arizona, California, Nevada, Texas, and Wisconsin; the 
effects of green pricing programs in several states; and renewables mandates in Minnesota. For more information 
see EIA 2004.  
7 Several states have passed laws limiting emissions of some combination of NOx, SO2, mercury, and CO2 from 
electricity generators. Most of these laws or regulations—such as new regulations in Connecticut and Massachusetts 
that limit nonozone season emissions of NOx—are formulated as limits on emission rates. The largest state actions 
are in North Carolina and New York, which have recently placed emissions caps on its largest coal-fired plants. A 
similar plan has been adopted in New Hampshire for all existing fossil fuel–fired generators. 
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country, we assume that prices are set according to cost-of-service regulation at average cost. We 
simulate the model through 2025 and extrapolate our results to 2030 in order to calculate returns 
to investment choices. 
2.1.2. Policy Scenarios 
In all policy cases, the annual CO2 emissions target is set by calculating a 20% decline 
from 2008 baseline emissions levels in the RGGI region, with the emissions reduction to be 
phased in on a linear basis between 2008 and 2025. The RGGI region is characterized as the 
nine-state region including New England, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. 
We give special consideration to new plants forecast for the MAAC region of NERC. 
Unless otherwise noted, we assume all new plants fired by fossil fuel (e.g., natural gas) located in 
MAAC are built anywhere in the Mid-Atlantic region in the baseline scenario and built outside 
the RGGI region (i.e., in Maryland and Pennsylvania) in all policy cases. Where plants will be 
built many years into the future is unknowable today. Access to transmission is one important 
factor, along with others that cumulatively may be more important than the presence of the 
RGGI policy. However, given the lack of transmission constraints within the Mid-Atlantic region 
in the model, with all other things equal, it makes sense that a plant locating in the region would 
choose a location that avoids the constraints of the RGGI program. This model design is one way 
in which model-estimated leakage is likely to overestimate the actual leakage that would occur. 
Hence, we do not focus on the quantity of leakage but instead compare the different approaches 
to allocation in qualitative terms. 
Furthermore, when nonemitting renewable plants qualify for the allocation of emissions 
allowances, we assume that all new plants built in the Mid-Atlantic region qualify. This 
assumption is for modeling convenience but also accounts for the expectation that a qualifying 
facility would be more likely to locate on the RGGI side of a political boundary, all other things 
equal, if it could realize cost reductions by doing so. In fact, the portion of the Mid-Atlantic 
region located inside the RGGI region has limited renewable resources. However, to facilitate a 
consistent comparison between the baseline and policy cases, we always account for all new 
renewable investments in the entire Mid-Atlantic region as locating within the RGGI region. 
The three bookend approaches to the distribution of emissions allowances that we 
analyze are historic (to emitters on the basis of historic generation in 1999), auction, and 
updating (to emitters on the basis of recent-year generation with a 2-year lag). Variations for 
each bookend case are listed in Table 1. Two choices characterize each scenario: Which 
generators are eligible for emissions allowances, and on what basis are allowances distributed? 
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We consider four mixed approaches. We also consider two types of constraints on the future of 
electricity supply: constrained transmission capability and higher natural gas prices. 
2.2. Measures for Evaluation 
The measures for evaluating these policy scenarios include changes in electricity price, 
economic measures of efficiency (including resource costs and changes in economic surplus), 
and changes in the value of existing generation assets. Efficiency results are measured in 1999$ 
from 2003 to 2030 and valued according to the usual method used in benefit–cost analysis, that 
is, the net present value (NPV) of Change in Economic Surplus = Change in Producer Surplus + 
Change in Consumer Surplus + Change in Government Revenues. 
Producer surplus is the change in economic profit—that is, the value of revenues in 
excess of costs, where costs include payments to all factors of production, including labor, fuel, 
and annual capital costs. This measure is different from an accounting measure of profit, which 
typically also includes payments to invested capital, which are not considered economic profit 
unless those payments exceed the market rate of payments to capital. Consumer surplus is an 
analogous measure, reflecting the well-being of consumers in excess of what they have to pay for 
electricity services. 
The auction mechanism also yields government revenues that could be used to fund 
public benefit programs, to compensate those who are adversely affected by the program, or for 
some other purpose. In any case, these revenues have a value that offsets some of the cost 
reflected in a decline in producer and consumer surplus under the auction. The public finance 
literature offers the guidance that the value of a dollar raised from emissions fees is greater than 
face value when that revenue is used to offset preexisting taxes such as labor or capital income 
taxes that impose inefficiency in the economy (Goulder et al. 1999). We take a cautious posture 
in this regard, assuming revenues have a social value just equal to their face value. 
One should note that economic efficiency is only one measure of public policy. Equity 
and other concerns may override efficiency. An increase in electricity price may be viewed as 
enhancing efficiency, for example, because it provides a signal to encourage the purchase of 
energy-efficient appliances, but it also could cause hardship. 
We look at the distributional consequences of different approaches to allocation for the 
industry by evaluating how these approaches affect the market value of generating assets. Asset 
values are measured in 1999$ by calculating the NPV of producer surplus from different types of 
electricity generators from 2003 to 2030. We aggregate generators by fuel, for new and existing 
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generators, and look at regulated and competitive regions separately as well as the nation as a 
whole. 
2.3. Simulation Model 
We use Resources for the Future’s (RFF’s) electricity market model, Haiku, to analyze 
the effects of different approaches to allocation under a RGGI cap-and-trade program for GHGs 
focused on the electricity sector.8 Haiku looks at the effects of the policies on the behavior of 
electricity producers and consumers as well as the resulting implications for costs, prices to 
consumers, and the emissions levels and locations. It is a national equilibrium model of 13 
regional U.S. electricity markets with endogenous investment in and retirement of generation and 
pollution control capital. 
The supply side of the model is built using capacity, generation, and heat rate data for the 
complete set of commercial electricity plants in the United States from various EIA datasets. For 
modeling purposes, these plant-level data are aggregated into 39 representative plants in each 
region. The capacity for a model plant is determined by aggregating the capacity of the 
individual constituent plants in a given region that are of the same type as the model plant.9 
However, no region contains every one of these model plants. For example, the New England 
region does not contain any geothermal plants. Factor prices (such as the cost of capital and 
labor) are held constant, and fuel price forecasts are calibrated to match EIA price forecasts (EIA 
2004). Fuel market modules for coal and natural gas calculate prices that are responsive to factor 
demand. 
The demand side of the market is characterized by three customer classes, with demand 
divided across three seasons and four time blocks within each season. The quantity of electricity 
demand responds to changes in electricity price. The level of electricity demand is calibrated to 
match EIA forecasts for the baseline and elasticity estimates drawn from the academic literature 
                                                 
8 The model has been used in several peer-reviewed publications and was compared with other models in two 
sessions of the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF 1998, 2001). Paul and Burtraw (2002) provide further 
documentation. 
9 A model plant is defined by the combination of its technology and fuel source (coal, natural gas, oil, hydro, or 
nuclear). For example, some steam plants run on oil, others on natural gas; the same is true for gas turbine plants.  
Coal is different from the other fuels in that it has 14 subcategories based on the originating region and sulfur 
content. Coal users are broken down into demand regions that have different costs associated with each type of coal, 
which reflect the varying interregional transport costs. To reduce SO2 or mercury emissions, model plants might find 
it more cost-effective to change the type of coal used than to install new pollution controls. 
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and other sources. Electricity trade between regions is also allowed, subject to transmission 
losses and physical transmission constraints. 
3. Results for “Bookend” Scenarios 
In this section, results are presented first for a set of bookend scenarios that are compared 
with a baseline scenario that represents a forecast in the absence of the RGGI. In subsequent 
sections, results are presented for several sensitivity analyses that consider variations on the 
bookend scenarios, combinations of features, or different assumptions about features of the 
baseline. 
Baseline emissions for the nation and for the RGGI region are presented in Table 2. 
Emissions of the conventional pollutants (NOx, SO2, and mercury) are expected to fall between 
2008 and 2025 in the baseline scenario because of CAIR implementation. State multiple-
pollutant rules that are not modeled would strengthen this trend. 
However, CO2 emissions in the baseline scenario are shown to rise by 20% over the same 
period nationally and by nearly the same rate within the RGGI region. In 2008, CO2 emissions in 
the RGGI region form the basis for calculating emissions targets. Under the RGGI targets, CO2 
emissions are assumed to decline linearly by 20% between 2008 and 2025, leading to an 
emissions target of 100 million tons in 2025. 
Results comparing the baseline scenario with the three bookend policy cases are reported 
in Tables 3–5. In the baseline, the average annual retail electricity price is expected to be 
$103.4/MWh in 2025 in the nine-state RGGI region and $66.6/MWh nationally—about two-
thirds of the price in the RGGI region. 
The policy bookends include 100% allocation through three different mechanisms: The 
historic approach would distribute allowances to CO2 emitters in the region on the basis of their 
historic share of generation in 1999, the auction would distribute allowances through sale by the 
government or another public institution, and the updating approach would distribute allowances 
to emitters on the basis of their share of total generation by emitters during the 2 preceding years. 
We make several key observations by comparing the pure versions (100% allocation in each 
case) of these approaches. 
Electricity price increases in all scenarios. As indicated in Table 3, the average 
electricity price is higher in each case than in the baseline. 
Consumers prefer the updating approach because it leads to the lowest electricity 
price of the three policy scenarios. Similarly, in each case, total generation within the RGGI 
region falls relative to the baseline, but it falls the least—by less than one-half as much—under 
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updating than under the other approaches. This attribute of updating follows from the incentive 
to increase electricity generation in order to earn a larger award of emissions allowances. 
Coal-fired generation falls under all approaches but falls the most under updating. 
The greater decline in coal under the updating approach—to one-half the level of the other 
approaches—is a result of the improvement in the relative cost of generation with natural gas 
compared to coal. 
Gas-fired generation falls under the historic and auction approaches but increases 
substantially under updating. The emissions rates for natural gas are below the average for 
emitting sources, whereas those for coal are above average. Hence, natural gas is the preferred 
technology for responding to the incentive to expand production under updating. Generation with 
natural gas increases by 33% under updating relative to the baseline but falls by about 12% under 
the other approaches. The price of CO2 emissions allowances is twice as high in the updating 
case because of the overwhelming incentive to increase gas-fired generation, which more than 
compensates for the decreased average emissions from natural gas sources. 
Figure 1 illustrates the going-forward costs of electricity generation for a representative 
existing coal plant and a new natural gas combined cycle plant in the RGGI region. Going-
forward costs are the expenses associated with bringing power from this plant to market in the 
future: fuel cost, fixed costs, and operating and maintenance costs. For existing and new plants, 
going-forward costs also include new capital investments in post-combustion pollution controls, 
operational costs, and the cost of emissions allowances net of the permit allocation to comply 
with the CAIR rule; for new plants, they also include capital costs. 
In Figure 1, the component labeled CO2 represents the opportunity cost of using CO2 
allowances under the RGGI policy that is added to going-forward costs, and permits represent 
the value of the allocation of CO2 permits to the plant. In the bookend updating case, emissions 
allowances are earned by generating electricity, and their value is subtracted from other costs to 
arrive at the net cost of future generation. Because the change in net cost is less than the change 
in gross cost, the change in electricity price in a competitive power market is relatively small 
with an updating approach. 
The value of CO2 allowances awarded per megawatt-hour of generation is the same for 
the coal and gas plants; however, the CO2 cost is more than twice as great for the coal plant. 
Hence, the allocation is equal to less than half of the CO2 cost at the existing coal plant and 
greater than the CO2 cost at the new natural gas plant. Net costs at the coal plant (about 
$48/MWh) remain slightly below the net costs at the gas plant  (about $52/MWh). Nonetheless, 
the cost difference is negligible compared with the difference in the absence of the RGGI CO2 
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policy, where the cost of the coal plant ($30/MWh) is substantially less than the cost at the gas 
plant ($53/MWh). 
With the bookend historic approach, only the existing coal plant earns an allocation. The 
plant is endowed with the allowance value, regardless of whether it generates electricity. Hence, 
the value is not subtracted from going-forward costs. The magnitude of the CO2 cost is much 
smaller with a historic approach than with an updating approach because the price of emissions 
allowances is lower. 
Figure 1 also illustrates the influence of the RGGI CO2 policy on the cost of compliance 
with the CAIR rule for conventional pollutants. One sees that the cost of SO2 and mercury 
control per megawatt-hour at the existing coal plant is greater under historic allocation of CO2 
emissions allowances than under updating, primarily because the cost of acquiring allowances 
for SO2 and mercury exceeds the plant’s endowment under CAIR and Title IV. Generation at the 
existing coal plant under the historic approach to CO2 allowances is roughly twice as large as 
under updating. The values represented in the graph are model solutions after costs are spread 
over the equilibrium level of generation under each policy. Note also that fuel costs per 
megawatt-hour are greater under the historic approach when the plant is more heavily used 
because more expensive fuel is used to help the plant comply with the CAIR rule.10
Renewable generation does relatively poorly under an updating approach. 
Renewable generation is less than with the historic approach and even less than in the baseline 
scenario. The lower level of renewable generation is a familiar result in this and other models. 
Typically, natural gas and renewables compete for new generation, and market share gains for 
one come at the expense of the other (Palmer and Burtraw 2004). This result changes when 
renewables qualify for a share of emissions allowances. 
The decline in conventional pollutant emissions in the Northeast accelerates 
dramatically under the RGGI. Emissions are expected to fall substantially over time in the 
baseline scenario. However, the RGGI policy dramatically accelerates this trend. Emissions of 
conventional pollutants fall in all cases, but as a consequence of the shift in generation from coal 
to natural gas, conventional pollutant emissions are substantially lower under an updating 
                                                 
10 This representative plant is a “model plant” in the simulation model that aggregates constituent plants of similar 
technological characteristics, so the results are the average for this group of constituent plants. Under the historic 
approach, nearly twice the capacity of this plant still exists in 2025 compared with under updating, and the amount 
of wet scrubbing in place is greater in absolute terms but less in proportion to generation capacity. The unscrubbed 
capacity uses more expensive, lower-sulfur fuel. 
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approach than under a historic or auction approach. Annual NOx emissions are reduced by more 
than 40%, and annual SO2 emissions are reduced by about 46% under the historic and auction 
approaches. Under the updating approach, the annual NOx emissions are reduced by more than 
65%, and annual SO2 emissions are reduced by 81% from baseline levels. Mercury emissions are 
reduced by almost as large of a percentage. In every case, however, national emissions of NOx, 
SO2, and mercury do not change because of emissions caps, so the decrease in emissions inside 
the RGGI region is offset by an increase outside the region. 
The RGGI policy leads to a substantial reduction in the cost of complying with 
regulations on conventional pollutants. The activities to comply with RGGI lessen the need to 
install post-combustion controls to reduce emissions of SO2, NOx, and mercury. In 2025, the 
avoided investment in control cost is about $100 million under historic and auction approaches 
and about $180 million under the updating approach. The use of SO2, NOx, and mercury 
emissions allowances also is reduced. In 2025, emissions reductions lead to savings on emissions 
allowances of about $80 million under the historic and auction approaches and about $250 
million under the updating approach. Total avoided compliance cost with SO2, NOx, and mercury 
rules is about $180 million under the historic and auction approaches and about $436 million 
under the updating approach. 
CO2 emissions leakage to outside the RGGI region is lowest under an updating 
approach. In almost all cases, the greatest decrease in CO2 emissions at the national level occurs 
with updating. The power generated outside the RGGI region (at plants not subject to the 
emissions cap) for import into the region increases. However, the incentive to increase 
generation within the RGGI region under an updating approach offsets this increase somewhat, 
causing less emissions leakage to outside the region. 
In all scenarios, electricity price increases for the rest of nation because of the increased 
demand for electricity to be imported into the RGGI region. The demand for generation that is 
not subject to the emissions cap drives up marginal cost in the regions supplying power, which 
increases prices. Nationally, leakage is lowest and emissions reductions are greatest with the 
updating approach. 
Findings about leakage should be interpreted with caution. We find the percentage of 
leakage to be sensitive. For example, a small change in natural gas prices due to changes in gas 
demand in the RGGI region can lead to a small change in the investment profile on the other side 
of the country in 2025, having a large effect on the leakage calculation for the whole horizon. 
This effect highlights the importance of modeling institutions that may be put in effect to 
properly mitigate leakage and to focus on the proper metric. 
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One may reasonably question whether national forecast changes for 2025 under a RGGI 
policy have meaning if the rest of the country pursues a business-as-usual policy. Many 
observers expect other regions of the country or the nation to follow the RGGI example and 
adopt some form of CO2 policy. In subsequent analysis, we intend to address these issues to 
develop a transparent measure of leakage. For this discussion, we focus on cumulative emissions 
reductions at the national level to identify qualitative relationships among the approaches to 
distributing allowances. 
The social cost of updating is three times that of the other approaches. From a broad 
social perspective, the change in economic surplus represents the social cost of meeting 
emissions targets. The change in economic surplus reported in Table 4 is the partial equilibrium 
measure of social cost within the electricity sector only. Three components of social cost 
(consumer surplus, producer surplus, and CO2 revenue) are reported for 2025. 
The social costs of the auction and historic approaches are the same, but who bears 
the cost differs. The auction and historic approaches have almost identical social costs of about 
$300 million in 2025. The auction imposes a substantial cost on consumers, which is offset by 
government revenue that can be expected to flow back to households (i.e., to taxpayers) or 
through other programs. The historic approach imposes a similar burden on consumers, but the 
revenues from allowance sales flow to producers rather than the government because producers 
receive the value of the emissions allowances through the allocation mechanism. 
The updating approach imposes the least direct cost on consumers because it leads to the 
smallest increase in electricity price. However, it imposes a cost on producers that is almost as 
great as under the auction approach, because the lower electricity price means less revenue per 
unit of electricity generated. The total social cost within the RGGI region electricity sector for 
the updating approach is $700 million—40% greater than that of the other approaches. 
Under the historic and auction approaches, total economic surplus outside the RGGI 
region increases slightly because of resources allocated to supplying electricity to the RGGI 
region. However, a sizeable redistribution between consumers and producers occurs. Producers 
outside the RGGI region that supply power to the RGGI region benefit at the expense of 
consumers outside the region, who face higher prices. A similar pattern in the allocation of 
surplus changes between consumers and producers outside the RGGI region occurs under 
updating, but the net effect is a decrease in total surplus. 
In the aggregate, producers realize the lowest value of existing generation assets 
under updating. Table 5 summarizes the change in the NPV of generation assets in the baseline 
scenario and the change in value under each approach. It differs from the change in producer 
surplus reported in Table 4, which is a snapshot for just 2025. 
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The effect of allocation on asset values varies significantly across types of 
generators. Table 5 indicates that the aggregate of existing and new gas-fired generation 
generally gains value relative to the baseline under historic and updating approaches and slightly 
loses value under an auction approach. Under all approaches, the asset value of gas-fired 
generation that was in existence as of 1999 increases. The aggregate of existing and additional 
gas capacity increases in asset value under historic and updating approaches and declines slightly 
under an auction approach. 
Note that Table 5 indicates a negative value for gas-fired assets in the baseline. This 
measure includes a rental cost of capital for payment on capital investments. In cases where 
investments have proven uneconomic, the calculation of asset value is negative. Facilities 
generally continue to operate because revenues remain greater than going-forward variable costs. 
In some cases, debt service has been written down for accounting purposes, and our baseline 
measure therefore would not correspond to an accounting measure. However, this practice does 
not have a bearing on our calculation of the change in asset value from baseline under various 
policy scenarios. 
No new coal-fired or nuclear generating capacity is built in the RGGI region, so the 
change in asset value for these technologies applies only to existing assets. Coal-fired generation 
assets just break even under the historic approach and do the worst under updating, losing 
substantial value relative to the baseline scenario. Existing nuclear assets benefit substantially 
under a historic or auction approach compared with the baseline. However, nuclear assets lose 
value under the updating approach, which has a lower electricity price than under historic and 
auction approaches and leads to lower variable costs for gas units that qualify for allowances, 
thereby pushing some incremental nuclear generation out of the dispatch order. In variations of 
updating discussed below, we find that nuclear units do substantially better when they qualify for 
emissions allowances. 
When all types of assets are aggregated, the NPV of generation assets increases 
substantially under historic allocation and decreases slightly under an auction. The fact that the 
market value of industry assets is minimally affected under the auction approach may appear to 
be a paradox but can result from several factors: the long-lived nature of capital investments, the 
distribution of capital intensity, emissions intensity and fuel intensity of different technologies 
for generating electricity, and variation in electricity demand by time of day. Meanwhile, in the 
aggregate, the value of generation assets under the updating approach declines by more than 
three times the decline under an auction. 
In Maryland and the part of Pennsylvania that together constitute the portion of the 
MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region, the change in the NPV of generation is 
20 Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
positive for all types of assets. This result follows from the increased sales supplied to the RGGI 
region and from the increase in electricity price that applies to every unit of production, 
including that delivered to native customers outside of the RGGI region. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the value of generation assets under various approaches, 
including the bookend approaches and variations discussed in the following sections. The 
technologies listed include nuclear and coal, for which are composed of only existing plants 
since all the plants are existing because no new plants are built, and gas, for which plants are 
both existing and new. The overall generation technologies for the industry also are represented 
(as All). The three bookend cases discussed previously are indicated by the labels: Heg (historic), 
Auction, and Demit (updating). Labels at the bottom of the graph correspond to the scenario and 
the general type of approach; to identify precise mappings, compare the labels on the specific 
points with the scenarios listed in Table 1. 
Even before discussing the variations on the bookend approaches in detail, Figure 2 
allows several general observations. Nuclear assets almost always gain value under RGGI. The 
one exception is the bookend updating case in which natural gas generation expands and there is 
little change in electricity price. However, in the cases in which nuclear generation earns an 
allocation, it does substantially better, as indicated by the peaks in its line graph. 
Gas-fired generation assets always maintain and sometimes gain value. The only 
exception is under the auction approach, in which gas loses value slightly. Meanwhile, the only 
time coal-fired generation assets do not lose substantial value is under the historic approaches 
and the mixed approaches that combine historic allocation with an auction. Under a couple of the 
historic approaches, existing coal-fired plants actually gain value because of the generous 
allowance allocation. 
In the aggregate, the change in value for the industry is a weighted average of changes in 
the value of individual plants. Hence, although some technologies and some firms may gain or 
lose substantial value, the change in value for the industry is muted because winners offset 
losers. The industry does the worst under the bookend updating approach, but in the aggregate, 
the industry experiences little change in value under most non-bookend updating approaches and 
the auction approach. However, in the aggregate, the industry gains substantial value under the 
historic approach. The following sections provide more details on the variations in allocation 
approaches that were modeled. 
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4. Variations in Results for Historic Approach 
Two variations to the bookend historic approach are described in Tables 6–8. The 
bookend distributes allowances to emitters on the basis of historic generation. One variation 
distributes allowances to emitters on the basis of historic emissions; another distributes 
allowances to all generators on the basis of historic generation. 
Price and generation differ little among these variations on the historic approach. 
The overview of electricity price, generation, and emissions in Table 6 shows the main 
difference: Cumulative national CO2 emissions are much higher under the scenario in which 
allowances are distributed to all generators on the basis of generation. 
The differences that emerge among the historic approaches are largely due to the 
characterization of stranded asset recovery policies in the model. The term stranded assets 
describes generation assets that lost value as a result of electricity industry restructuring. We 
assume that 90% of stranded assets (and 0% of stranded benefits) are recovered through a 
surcharge on electricity price that is expected to continue for 10 years after the transition from 
regulation to competition. We assume the award of emissions allowances is considered in 
calculating the value of existing assets, so the surcharge is adjusted, leading to very slight 
changes in electricity price. When the model is exercised without stranded asset recovery, the 
historic approaches solve to exactly the same outcome with respect to electricity price and other 
measures listed in Table 6. 
The market values of various types of assets differ widely under the various 
approaches to historic allocation. Table 7 indicates there is very little difference in the social 
cost of the historic approaches or the distribution in cost between consumers and producers. 
However, Table 8 indicates that one can expect a difference in the incidence of the program 
among producers, depending on their portfolio of generation assets. Coal-fired generators within 
the RGGI region are significantly better off when they are allocated permits on the basis of 
emissions because their share of total emissions is higher than their share of total generation. 
Additionally, nuclear generators are much better off when permits are distributed to all 
generators on the basis of historic generation. 
5. Variations in Results for Updating Approach 
Several variations to the updating approach are reported in Tables 9–11. In the bookend 
approach, allowances are distributed to emitters on the basis of generation two years previous. 
Variations that are reported include distribution to all generators and separately adding the 
eligibility of incremental nonemitters, which include renewable and nuclear generation in excess 
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of 1999 levels. Another variation adds updating to emitters on the basis of heat input, with an 
additional factor favoring coal. 
In another variation, allowances are distributed only to nonemitters (renewable and 
incremental nuclear generation), including nonemitters located anywhere in the nation; this 
variation can be viewed as a type of offset program that might reduce leakage. Finally, in another 
variation, only nonemitters within the RGGI region qualify. Both of these last two approaches 
provide incentives to expand generation from nonemitters, somewhat analogous to an RPS. 
Recall that all renewables in the MAAC region of NERC are always included as part of RGGI 
when we characterize qualifying renewable generation. We also include incremental nuclear 
generation in the nonemitters category. 
Most of the variations on updating maintain lower increases in electricity price than 
other approaches. Electricity price increases are small when emitters receive some share of the 
allocation through updating. The two updating approaches with distribution only to nonemitters 
yield greater increases than do historic and auction approaches. 
CO2 allowance prices remain relatively high in most of the updating approaches. 
Total generation in the RGGI region is relatively high except when only nonemitters qualify. 
Total generation is highest of any approach examined when allocation is on the basis of heat 
input. The price of a CO2 allowance is high in the updating runs whenever electricity generation 
is relatively high because the allowances have a greater opportunity cost. The allowance price is 
highest when allowances are allocated on the basis of heat input because the allocation provides 
an incentive for coal-fired generation, which has a greater emissions rate and hence raises the 
opportunity cost of emissions allowances. The allowance price is lower—comparable to that 
under auction and historic approaches—when only nonemitters qualify. 
It is noteworthy that electricity price in the rest of the nation actually falls below baseline 
levels when nonemitters nationwide qualify for allowances. Cumulative emissions reductions at 
the national level are relatively high in this case. 
Updating distribution to all generators imposes the lowest social cost within the 
RGGI region of any policy examined. The economic surplus cost of the program varies among 
these approaches to updating and in some cases is substantially less than in the bookend case. 
Distribution to all generators reduces social cost because it reduces each generator’s share of 
allowances and therefore the value of the output subsidy that is awarded to changes in electricity 
generation. Although the change in social cost is very small within the RGGI region, additional 
social cost is imposed outside the region. 
The dynamic bookend approach was run with an allocation to demand conservation 
investments, but the results were not sufficiently different to warrant further investigation.  
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Within the RGGI region, distribution to nonemitters imposes large costs, whereas outside the 
region, benefits accrue as a result of subsidized investments. 
Updating affects different technologies in different ways. In general, these effects depend 
directly on whether a technology qualifies for distribution and on the value of the allowances in 
each case. The larger the number of kilowatt-hours generated that qualify for a share of the 
allowances, the lower the value to each individual facility. It is noteworthy that compared with 
the bookend approach, distribution to generators—including incremental generation by 
nonemitters—improves the value of every class of generation asset. We observe that 
•  the NPV of gas-fired generation does relatively well in most updating approaches, 
•  the NPV of coal-fired generation suffers under all updating approaches, and 
•  the NPV of nuclear generation benefits substantially whenever it qualifies for a share 
of allowances under updating and suffers otherwise, because there is little change in 
electricity price and the expansion in gas-fired generation crowds out some 
incremental nuclear generation. 
6. Mixed Approaches 
Several scenarios in which allowances are distributed through a combination of 
approaches are described in Tables 12–14. In the overview of changes in electricity price, 
generation, and emissions, the outcome is roughly a combination of the performance of each 
individual approach. One way this is not true is with respect to the CO2 allowance price, which 
tends toward the price for the auction bookend when the auction is combined with updating. The 
scenarios that combine an auction with dynamic allocation result in more emissions reductions at 
the national level than the scenarios that combine an auction with historic allocation. 
Changes in economic surplus measures for the combination of an auction with an 
updating approach are between those for the auction bookend and the updating bookend 
approaches. The economic cost for consumers is less than for the auction bookend, and like the 
auction, the cost to consumers is less than the gain in government revenues. Similarly, in the 
mixed auction–historic approach, as with each approach taken individually, producers outside 
the RGGI region benefit considerably from the opportunity to supply power at a higher 
electricity price to consumers in the RGGI region. Modifying the combined auction–historic case 
to compensate coal-fired generators more than gas-fired generators per kilowatt-hour of historic 
generation has no effect on the economic surplus costs of that mixed allocation approach. 
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The changes in the components of economic surplus under the various mixed approaches 
are compared with the other scenarios in Figure 3 for 2025. Changes in consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, CO2 revenue, and total surplus are plotted. The policy scenarios are ordered in 
terms of the size of their associated CO2 auction revenues and are grouped by general category of 
approach (updating, historic, mixed, or auction). 
Figure 3 shows that all the mixed scenarios produce revenues for the government that can 
be used for compensation or other purposes. The mixed scenarios that include historic allocation 
tend to substantially reduce gains to producers found under the pure historic approaches without 
imposing substantial costs in terms of total surplus losses or greater losses in consumer surplus 
than under the pure historic or the pure auction approach. Combining updating and auction 
approaches in equal proportions has a bigger adverse effect on consumers in the form of higher 
electricity prices than a pure updating approach that rewards incremental generation by 
nonemitters. All of the mixed approaches have very similar effects on total economic surplus but 
distinguish themselves in terms of effects on the different components of surplus. 
The increase in asset values for gas-fired generation in the mixed auction–updating 
approaches is close to that for the auction bookend, which is less than that for the updating 
bookend. The increase is slightly less when coal-fired generators earn twice as many allowances 
as gas-fired generators per kilowatt-hour of generation. The decrease in value for coal-fired 
generation is worse than for the auction approach but not as bad as under updating. The mixed 
auction–historic approach reduces the losses to coal-fired generators compared to the auction 
approach, especially when coal-fired generators earn twice as many allowances as gas-fired 
generators do per unit of historic generation. Nuclear generation benefits in the mixed approach 
cases because the increases in electricity price are greater than under updating. For the industry 
as a whole, the change in asset values is small in the aggregate because the mixed approaches 
yield greater increases in electricity price than the updating bookend does. Increasing the fraction 
of allowances that are auctioned while updating the remaining allowances generally has a 
positive impact on the asset values of all types of generators, including coal-fired generators. The 
one exception is that moving from a 50% auction–50% updating approach to a 100% auction 
approach has a negative effect on the asset value of gas-fired generators in the RGGI region. 
The mixed auction–historic approaches have a positive effect on average asset values 
across the industry and produce a much smaller drop in the value of coal-fired generation assets 
than the mixed auction–updating approaches. Interestingly, the increase in average asset values 
for existing units in the RGGI region under the auction–historic approach based on generation is 
the roughly the same as that for generators outside the RGGI region. In the RGGI region, these 
assets experience the program costs and receive a share of allowance allocation that is 
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approximately equal, resulting in a financial situation similar to that of assets outside the RGGI 
region. 
7. Constrained Cases 
Several constraints in the electricity system affect the operation of individual facilities 
and the adjustment in prices in ways that are not fully represented in the model. Many are short-
run constraints, such as fuel supply contracts that would be renegotiated over time. Others, such 
as requirements to balance load on the grid, affect individual facilities but are not expected to 
have a noticeable effect on the behavior of the entire system. However, two types of constraints 
in the Northeast seem to be potentially important in the long run: the ability to supply natural gas 
to the Northeast, and the capability of the transmission grid to deliver power. 
If natural gas is an important component of achieving compliance with RGGI, then 
changes in gas prices or demand could be important. To address this issue, we ran a scenario in 
which gas prices at the national level were 15% above baseline levels. In addition, any increase 
in Northeast gas demand above baseline levels in 2008 resulted in a regional change in price that 
was twice as sensitive as in the baseline scenario. 
Our findings from the standard baseline are repeated in the first columns in Tables 15 and 
17, and in the second column of Table 16. The second columns of Tables 15 and 17 consider the 
historic bookend approach with higher gas prices. The differences in electricity prices and the 
choice of generation technology are substantial, largely because of the change in natural gas 
prices that we assume occurs independent of changes in gas demand as a result of the RGGI 
program. Another result is interesting, nonetheless: The NPV of all technologies is substantially 
higher in the constrained gas case than in the baseline scenario (Table 17). This finding follows 
from the increase in the cost of natural gas–fired generation, which is the technology that 
determines marginal electricity price in most time blocks. Hence, a higher gas price translates 
into a higher electricity price, and the change in revenue generally is greater than the change in 
cost for the industry. 
A second potentially important constraint is transmission capability. In the baseline 
model inter-regional transmission capability is represented by quantity constraints. In the 
constrained transmission model, inter-regional transmission capability is also constrained by 
additional prices, cost thresholds, and line losses. Intra-regional line losses also are represented 
on average. Intra-regional quantity constraints are not captured directly, but some of the 
implications of those constraints are represented. For example, the model is calibrated to achieve 
what would otherwise appear to be out-of-merit-order dispatch of oil-fired facilities, which tend 
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to run because of the limitations to transmission into the New York metropolitan area and the 
difficulty of siting new sources in the area. 
The first column under “Constrained baseline” in Tables 15–17 is a new baseline that 
includes both the natural gas constraint described above and a 10% reduction in inter-regional 
transmission capability; the subsequent column describes the historic bookend under these 
constraints. 
The effect of adding constraints on natural gas supply and electricity transmission 
capability is larger than the effect of adding the RGGI policy. The constraints cause 
substantial changes in the absence of the RGGI policy (evident from a comparison of the first 
and third columns of Table 15). Moreover, the changes in electricity price and other overview 
measures that occur as a result of adding the RGGI policy to the constrained no-policy baseline 
(third and fourth columns of Table 15) are comparable to those that occur when the policy is 
added to the central case baseline (Table 3). Also, the constraint on natural gas price is more 
important than the constraint on inter-regional transmission capability (Table 15). The model 
with both constraints varies little compared with the model with only high gas price. 
Producers benefit substantially in the face of constraints on natural gas price or 
transmission capability. Table 16 presents the change in economic surplus reported as the 
difference from the central case baseline. The higher gas price negatively affects consumers and 
benefits producers. Again, the change in surplus due to adding the constraints in the absence of 
the policy tends to be larger than the change due to adding the policy. 
The value of every type of generation asset in the RGGI region improves with the 
additional constraints, and the value of every type of asset improves further with the 
implementation of the policy. Even the value of natural gas–fired generation assets improves 
with the constraint of higher gas prices. 
The modeled constraints do not appear to have a strong impact on RGGI 
implementation. Overall, the changes in electricity price, technology choices for electricity 
generation, and the cost distribution due to implementation of the RGGI policy do not vary 
substantially in the presence of constraints on natural gas supply or transmission capability in the 
way we have modeled them. In the historic, auction, and many updating approaches, an 
expansion of natural gas–fired generation does not play a significant role in compliance. Hence, 
changes in the cost of natural gas will affect the baseline and the policy scenario equally. 
Incorporating transmission rules aimed at reducing leakage could play a big role, but that 
modeling is left to future research. 
27 Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
8. Renewable Portfolio Standard Cases 
Our standard base case and policy scenarios do not include all of the state-level policies 
to promote renewables used in the RGGI states. To get a sense of how policies to encourage 
renewables might affect the results of a RGGI policy, we ran a baseline scenario against one 
policy case with an aggregate regional RPS. These results are presented in Tables 18–20. 
The RPS policy scenario we developed is intended to reasonably reflect all of the existing 
renewables policies for states in the three NERC regions covered or partially covered by RGGI 
(i.e., the New England states, New York, and the MAAC NERC region). It is not intended to be 
an exact representation of RPS policies in the included states but a plausible approximation of 
existing policies that probably represents a slightly higher level of renewables requirements than 
embodied in current policy because of rounding. The policy is specified as mandated increments 
to existing non-hydro renewable generation of 4.4%, 9.5%, 11.5%, and 12.6% in 2008, 2015, 
2020, and 2025, respectively. It also includes increased imports from Canada to New York that 
are largely expected to come from hydro generation. 
In an RPS baseline (e.g., in the absence of the RGGI policy), renewable generation 
increases by 67% relative to the standard baseline within the three NERC regions by 2025, 
whereas electricity price remains roughly the same and CO2 emissions decrease 9%, by 14 
million tons. The increase in renewable generation mostly replaces gas-fired generation because 
coal-fired generation remains nearly the same and gas-fired generation declines by 18%. The 
price of a renewable credit is $16/MWh in 2025. 
We model the addition of the RGGI policy by assuming CO2 allowances are distributed 
to emitters on the basis of historic generation, in a scenario analogous to the bookend historic 
approach. The RPS policy by itself is much more potent than the RGGI policy by itself with 
respect to generation by renewables (Table 18). The big difference between these policy 
scenarios is the effect on technology: The increased renewable generation displaces gas-fired 
generation under the RPS policy, whereas coal-fired generation declines by more than gas-fired 
generation under the RGGI policy. 
When the RGGI policy is combined with the RPS baseline, the level of generation by 
coal is intermediate—above the level with just the RGGI policy and below the level with just the 
RPS. However, gas-fired generation declines even more than under just the RPS policy, to 75% 
of the standard baseline and 91% of the RPS baseline. The price of electricity in the RGGI region 
rises to $106/MWh (an increase of $2.70/MWh from the RPS baseline), causing generation 
within the RGGI region to fall by 37 billion kWh below the RPS baseline. However, electricity 
price in 2025 with the RPS and the RGGI policy is $1.1/MWh lower than with the RGGI policy 
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alone. The electricity price is lower because the RPS encourages generation by renewables, 
which have lower variable costs and thus exert downward pressure on electricity price. 
Having an RPS in place lowers baseline CO2 emissions and thus the cost of CO2 
allowances. The CO2 allowance price in 2025 is $15.6/ton, about $2.50/ton less than without the 
RPS. The incentive for renewable generation clearly makes compliance with the regional CO2 
cap easier. The price of a renewable credit is $12/MWh in 2025 with the RGGI policy. Total 
renewable generation is slightly less than under just the RPS policy because total generation in 
the region is lower; the share of total generation made up by renewables remains equal to the 
RPS policy target. 
The economic cost of the policies is reported in Table 19. In the baseline scenario with 
RPS, the consumer surplus within the RGGI region is approximately the same as under the 
baseline alone, but producers are better off than under the standard baseline, at the expense of 
consumers outside the region. When the RGGI policy is added, the cost to consumers in the 
RGGI region is offset by an almost equal benefit to producers, with no net change in economic 
surplus from the standard baseline. Consumers are worse off because of the increase in 
electricity price. Compared with the bookend historic approach without the RPS, consumers in 
the RGGI region are substantially better off and producers are slightly better off. Nationally, the 
economic surplus results are similar to those in the RPS baseline. In both the RPS baseline and 
the combined RPS–RGGI policy cases, additional costs stem from the tax credits offered by the 
federal government and realized because of the expanded generation by renewables. This cost is 
not shown as a separate item but is evident in the subtotals and the national total in Table 19. 
The asset values of various types of generation are affected differently by the RPS and 
CO2 cap (Table 20). Within the RGGI region under the RPS policy, gas-fired and nuclear 
generation decline slightly in value, whereas coal-fired generation remains the same. Meanwhile, 
renewable generation increases substantially in value (not reported in the table). Outside the 
RGGI region but in the MAAC NERC region, the value of gas-fired generation increases 
modestly. Adding the CO2 cap causes the value of gas-fired and nuclear generation to increase 
within the RGGI region relative to the standard baseline, whereas coal-fired generation loses 
value. The effects on asset values of the RGGI policy with historic allocation are usually smaller 
in the presence of the RPS than in the bookend case. 
9. Conclusion 
In this research, we model historic, auction, and updating approaches to the allocation of 
emissions allowances that we call bookends, then model several variations on these approaches. 
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We find that how allowances are initially allocated has a substantial effect on electricity price 
and consumption, the mix of technologies used to generate electricity, the emissions levels of 
conventional pollutants, and the cost of controlling the emissions of conventional pollutants. 
The value of CO2 allowances created by the RGGI program is at least four times the 
social cost of mitigation. The fact that changes in electricity price depend on how emissions 
allowances are initially distributed suggests that allowance distribution offers a potentially 
important source of compensation. We assess the effects of different distribution approaches on 
the change in the market value of generation assets and find substantial variation depending on 
the method of allocation. 
The measure of compensation that is required to preserve asset value varies according to 
whether it is calculated at the level of the facility, business unit, firm, or state. Change in 
shareholder value depends on the portfolio of assets held by the firm. We do not calculate the 
change in value at the firm level in this paper, but policymakers may be interested in this 
information when considering how different parties are affected. 
A general pattern emerges from our modeling results of allocation approaches: A historic 
or auction approach is most efficient. The updating approach has about three times the social cost 
of the historic or the auction approach but has the political advantage of a lower electricity price 
and can be designed to reduce leakage. 
Recognizing that updating has attracted interest in the RGGI process, we explore several 
variations on the updating approach, with various consequences. It is noteworthy that one 
variation—updating allocation on the basis of all generation—has the lowest social cost within 
the RGGI region of any approach we modeled, partly because it imposes costs outside the 
region. Ultimately, however, updating has less attraction as a model for a national (or 
international) policy because of its higher social cost, and because of the difficulty in 
establishing a consistent allocation method across different sectors of the economy. Hence, we 
suggest that updating may be a useful tool for the initial implementation of RGGI but not at the 
national level. 
The approaches vary significantly in their aggregate effects on asset values and specific 
types of generation technology. The industry benefits most with the historic approach, and 
consumers benefit least. The auction approach is the intermediate case with respect to the effect 
on market value, and the updating approach leads to the greatest aggregate decline in market 
value for the industry. 
The auction approach that we model might be implemented in various forms. One is 
allocation to consumers, or a public benefit allocation, which endows a trustee with allowances 
that can be sold to the industry with the revenue applied to a variety of purposes. Some observers 
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have suggested that investments in energy conservation or renewables research could be funded 
through this kind of approach. 
Important limitations to these results stem from the level of aggregation used in the 
analysis. Intra-regional transmission constraints are not modeled. Electricity imports from 
Canada are parametric and do not change in response to the RGGI policy, which could affect the 
amount of emissions leakage that occurs. Out-of-merit-order dispatch that may result from long-
term fuel contracts or intra-regional transmission constraints is approximated based on evidence 
from recent years. We conduct sensitivity analyses with constraints on natural gas prices and 
transmission capability and find that the social cost of the RGGI program does not appear to be 
sensitive to these constraints. 
The variation that we discover in the measures and the performance of various policies 
suggests that policymakers have latitude in providing compensation to industry through the 
distribution of emissions allowances. We suggest that greater emphasis could be placed on 
compensation in the short run and on efficiency in the long run and indicate what some types of 
mixes in approaches to allocation would accomplish. In the long run, on the national stage, a 
CO2 cap-and-trade policy could impose significant costs on the economy. Hence, we suggest that 
efficiency concerns should be a central consideration in the long-run policy design. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Modeled Scenarios 
Approach  Eligibility  Basis for Allocation 
Historic        
Heg a.  (Bookend)  Emitters Historic  generation 
Hag b.  Generators  Historic  generation 
Hee  c.   Emitters  Historic emissions 
Auction        
Auc d.  (Bookend)  Emitters  Auction 
Updating        
Demit  e. (Bookend)  Emitters  Recent generation 
Dag  f.   Generators  Recent generation 
Dagig g.  Generators  Generation (emitters) or incremental 
generation (nonemitters) 
Dn3ig h.  Nonemitters  Incremental generation for nonemitters 
DnNig i.  Nonemitters 
nationwide 
Incremental generation for nonemitters 
Dehi  j  Emitters  Recent heat input with factor favoring coal 
Mixed        
MAHeg  k.   Historic (a) (50%) /  
Auction (d) (50%) 
Historic generation / Auction 
MADagig  m.  Auction (d) (50%) /  
Updating (e) (50%) 
Auction / Recent generation 
MA20Dagig  n.  Auction (d) (20%) /  
Updating (e) (80%) 
Auction / Recent generation 
MaHee  o.   Historic (a) (50%) /  
Auction (d) (50%) 
Historic emissions / Auction 
MAHeg_coal  p.  Historic (a) (50%) /  
Auction (d) (50%) 
Historic emissions / Auction; coal-fired 
generation counts double 
MADeg_coal  q.  Auction (d) (50%) /  
Updating (e) (50%) 
Auction / Recent generation; coal-fired 
generation counts double 
Constrained        
HegGhi  r. Higher gas price  Emitters (Historic a)  Historic generation 
HegT10Ghi s.  Constraints
a   Emitters (Historic a)  Historic generation 
a New baseline: constrained transmission capability (assuming interregional capability in the Northeast reduced by 
10%) and higher gas price.  
Notes: Historic generation and historic emissions = 1999. Recent generation is based on two years previous to 
allocation. Incremental generation includes generation beyond 1999 levels. Higher gas price has national (Henry 
Hub) prices pegged 15% above baseline and supply price sensitivity scenarios for imports into the Northeast above 
baseline levels doubled. 
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Table 2. National Annual Baseline Emissions and Annual Policy Emissions Targets 
Pollutant  2008 2015 2020 2025 
Nationwide         
  CO2 (million tons)  2,755 2,910 3,102 3,311
  NOx (thousand tons) 3,891 2,551 2,615 2,670
  SO2 (thousand tons)  7,181 4,963 4,293 3,178
  Mercury (tons)
a 62 40 38 36
RGGI region 
  CO2 (million tons)  124 129 136 147
  NOx (thousand tons) 106 111 117 118
  SO2 (thousand tons)  415 238 196 193
  Mercury (tons)
a 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2
Reduction target 
  CO2 (million tons)  124 114 107 100
a Includes mercury emissions from uncontrolled municipal solid waste facilities that in fact have already begun to 
achieve important emissions reductions. 
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Table 3. Overview for Bookend Cases, 2025 
Eligibility:   Emitters  Emitters  Emitters 
Basis:   Historic 
generation  Auction  Recent 
generation 
RGGI region  Baseline Historic  Auction  Updating 
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $103.4 $107.1 $107.2  $103.9
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  393 348 348  371
Coal 73 48 48  23
Gas 130 115 116  173
Nuclear 107 108 108  106
Renewable 34 40 40  32
TOTAL new capacity
a (GW)  28 31 31  33
Gas 23 24 24  28
Renewable 5 6 6  5
CO2 price (1999$/ton)  n/a $18.1 $18.3  $35.3
Emissions  
  CO2 (million tons)  147 100 99  98
  NOx (thousand tons)  118 70 70  41
  SO2 (thousand tons)  193 101 107  36
  Mercury (tons)  1.2 0.8 0.8  0.3
Rest of nation
b  
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $66.6 $66.8 $66.8  $66.9
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  4,847 4,885 4,886  4,861
CO2 reduction for nation cumulative (2008–
2025) (million tons)  n/a 201 233 289
Model  BL Heg Auc Demit
a Numbers may not sum because of rounding. 
bIncludes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 4. Change in Economic Surplus from Baseline (Social Cost), Bookend Cases, 2025 
(billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:  Emitters Emitters Emitters 
Basis:  Historic generation Auction  Recent generation 
RGGI region  Historic  Auction  Updating 
Consumers –1.6 –1.6 –0.2 
Producers 1.2 –0.6 –0.5 
CO2 revenue  0.0 1.8 0.0 
SUBTOTAL
a –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 
Rest of nation
b  
Consumers –1.2 –1.2 –1.3 
Producers 1.5 1.5 1.2 
SUBTOTAL
a 0.2 0.2 –0.2 
National TOTAL
a –0.3 –0.3 –0.9 
Model  Heg Auc Demit 
a Numbers may not add because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
bIncludes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 5. NPV of Existing and New Generation Assets, Change from Baseline, Bookend 
Cases (1999$/kW) 
Eligibility:   Emitters  Emitters Emitters 
Basis:    Historic generation Auction  Recent generation
RGGI region  Baseline (NPV) Historic  Auction  Updating 
Gas –273 54 –13 45
Coal 434 8 –185 –240
Nuclear 611 67 55 –51
Average ALL
b 164 60 –13 –45
Existing capacity only
c
Gas –375 228 17 102
Coal 434 8 –185 –240
Nuclear 611 67 55 –51
Average ALL
b 300 104 –3 –51
MD and PA
a
Gas –255 6 12 12
Coal 364 50 –185 24
Nuclear 653 51 51 20
Average ALL
b 229 23 26 8
Model  BL Heg Auc Demit
a Maryland and the portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity including types not listed separately. 
c Existing in 1999. 
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Table 6. Overview of Historic Allocation Cases 







RGGI region       
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $107.1 $106.8  $107.5
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  348 349  348
Coal 48 48  48
Gas 115 116  115
Nuclear 108 108  108
Renewable 40 40  40
New capacity
a (GW)  31 31  31
Gas 24 24  24
Renewable 6 6  6
CO2 price (1999$/ton)  $18.1 $18.2  $18.3
Emissions  
  CO2 (million tons)  100 100  100
  NOx (thousand tons)  70 72  71
  SO2 (thousand tons)  101 107  105
  Mercury (tons)  0.8 0.8  0.8
Rest of nation
b  
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $66.8 $66.8  $66.9
TOTAL generation(billion kWh) 4,885 4,886  4,887
CO2 reduction for nation cumulative (2008–
2025) (million tons)  201 219 249
Model  Heg Hee Hag
aNumbers may not sum because of rounding. 
bIncludes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 7. Change in Economic Surplus from Baseline (Social Cost), Historic Cases, 2025 
(billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:  Emitters Emitters  Generators 
Basis:  Historic generation Historic emissions Historic generation
RGGI region       
Consumers –1.6 –1.4 –1.7
Producers 1.2 1.0 1.3
CO2 revenue  0.0 0.0 0.0
SUBTOTAL
a –0.5 –0.5 –0.5
Rest of nation
b
Consumers –1.2 –1.1 –1.3
Producers 1.5 1.3 1.4
SUBTOTAL
a 0.2 0.1 –0.1
National TOTAL
a –0.3 –0.4 –0.6
Model  Heg Hee Hag
aNumbers may not add because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
bIncludes the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 8. Change from Baseline of Net Present Value of Generation Assets, Historic Cases 
(1999$/kw) 
Eligibility:  Emitters Emitters  Generators 
Basis:  Historic generation Historic emissions Historic generation 
RGGI region       
Gas 54 19 33 
Coal 8 34 –61 
Nuclear 67 48 169 
Average ALL
b 60 36 68 
MD and PA
a  
Gas 6 2 23 
Coal 50 55 46 
Nuclear 51 51 48 
Average ALL
b 23 23 24 
Model  Heg Hee Hag 
aMaryland and portion of Pennsylvania within the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity including types not listed separately. 
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Table 9. Overview for Updating Allocation Based on Generation, 2025 
Eligibility:  Emitters      Generators Generators Nationwide 
nonemitters 
Nonemitters in 
NY, NE, & MAAC 
Emitters 













Recent heat input 
with add’l factor 
favoring coal 
RGGI region             
Average electricity price 





   




(billion kWh)  371 374 367 350 356 376
Coal 23 43 39  48 52 22
Gas 173 129 137  114 104 169
Nuclear 106 108 107  108 108 107




33 35 33  32 34 32
Gas 28 25 25  24 23 26
Renewable 5 10 8 7 11 6




  CO2 (million tons)  98 100 100  100 100 100
  NOx (thousand tons)  41 65 63  69 73 51
  SO2 (thousand tons)  36 82 65  104 115 34
  Mercury (tons)  0.3 0.7 0.6  0.8 0.8 0.4
Rest of nation
b  
Average electricity price 






(billion kWh)  4,861 4,862 4,870 4,888 4,878 4,860
CO2 reduction nation, 
2008–2025 (million tons)  289 232 282 461 310 204
Model  Demit Dag Dagig DnNig Dn3ig DEhi
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Table 10. Change in Economic Surplus from Baseline (Social Cost) for Updating Cases, 2025 ( billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:  Emitters      Generators Generators Nationwide
nonemitters 
  Nonemitters in NY, 
NE, & MAAC 
Emitters 











Recent heat input 
with add’l factor 
favoring coal 
RGGI region             
Consumers     
     
   
–0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –1.5 –1.3 –0.2
Producers –0.5 0.1 –0.1 –0.5 0.4 –0.6
CO2 revenue  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SUBTOTAL
a –0.7 –0.2 –0.4 –2.1 –1.2 –0.8
Rest of nation
b    
Consumers     
     
   
–1.3 –0.6 –0.6 0.3 –0.9 –0.8
Producers 1.2 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.6 0.4
SUBTOTAL
a –0.2 –0.3 –0.1 1.3 0.5 –0.4
National TOTAL
a –0.9  –0.5 –0.6 –0.8 –0.6 –1.3 
Model  Demit    Dag Dagig DnNig Dn3ig DEhi
aNumbers may not add because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
bIncludes the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 11. Change from Baseline in Net Present Value of Generation Assets, Updating Cases (1999 $/kW) 
Eligibility:  Emitters      Generators Generators Nationwide
nonemitters 
  Nonemitters in NY, 
NE, & MAAC 
Emitters 












Recent heat input 
with add’l factor 
favoring coal 
RGGI region             
Gas   
 
   
45 –2 16 7 –3 –1
Coal –240  –231 –223 –159 –175 –235
Nuclear –51 136 53 93 147 –21
Average ALL  –45  5 –1 20 30 –57
MD and PA
a  
Gas   
   
   
 
 
12 –5 10 23 21 22
Coal 24 35 43 50 48 31
Nuclear 20 35 37 65 129 25
Average ALL
b 8 9 14 30 47 13
Model  Demit Dag Dagig DnNig Dn3ig Dehi
aMaryland and portion of Pennsylvania within the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity including types not listed separately. 
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Table 12. Overview for Mixed Approaches  
Eligibility:  Generators            Generators Emitters Emitters Emitters Emitters
Basis:  Auction 20%/ 
Recent gen. 80% 
Auction 50%/ 
Recent gen. 50% 
Auction 50%/ 
Historic gen. 50% 
Auction 50%/ 







RGGI region             
Average electricity price 
(1999$/MWh)  $103.9 $105.5 $107.5   
 
   
   
   
   
     
  
$107.1 $107.5 $105.5
TOTAL generation (billion kWh) 
 
359 354 348  349 348 356 
Coal 43 45 48  48 48 42
Gas 130 121 115  115 116 130
Nuclear 108 108 108  108
 
108 108
Renewable 42 42 40 40 40 40
New capacity
b (GW)  32 32 31  31 31 32 
Gas 25 25 25  24 24 25
Renewable 7 7 6 6 6 6
CO2 price (1999$/ton)  $24.4 $21.8 $18.3  $18.2 $18.4 $23.8 
Emissions 
  CO2 (million tons)  100 100 99  100 100 99 
  NOx (thousand tons)  64 67 69  69 70 61 
  SO2 (thousand tons)  83 99 104  103 105 78 
  Mercury (tons)  0.7 0.8 0.8  0.8 0.8 0.7 
Rest of Nation
c    
Average electricity price 
(1999$/MWh)  $66.7 $66.8 $66.8   
   
   
 
$66.8 $66.8 66.8
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  4,878 4,882 4,883 4,885 4,882 4,880
CO2 reduction nation, 2008–2025 
(million tons)  283 284 234 190 199 241
Model  MA20Dagig MADagig MAHeg MAHee MAHeg_coal MADeg_coal 
a Coal-fired generation counts twice.
b Numbers may not sum because of rounding. 
c Includes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
  45Resources for the Future                                                                                                                                        Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
Table 13. Change in Economic Surplus from Baseline (Social Cost), Mixed Cases, 2025 (billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:              Generators Generators Emitters Emitters Emitters Emitters
Basis:    Auction  20%/













RGGI region             
Consumers     
     
     
–0.2 –0.9 –1.8 –1.6 –1.8 –0.9
Producers –0.7 –0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 –1.0
CO2 revenue  0.5  1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 
SUBTOTAL
b –0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –0.5 –0.6 –0.5
Rest of nation
c     
Consumers     
     
     
–0.7 –0.9 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0 –1.2
Producers 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3
SUBTOTAL
b –0.1 –0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0
National TOTAL
b  –0.6  –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.3 –0.5 
Model  MA20Dagig    MADagig MAHeg MAHee MAHeg_coal MADeg_coal
a Coal -fired generation counts twice. 
b Numbers may not sum because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
c Includes the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 14. Change in Net Present Value of Generation Assets from Baseline, Mixed Cases (1999 $/kW) 
Eligibility:  Generators            Generators Emitters Emitters Emitters Emitters
Basis:    Auction  20%/
Recent gen. 80% 
Auction 50%/ 











RGGI region             
Gas 7   
     
     
     
14 28 5 11 4
Coal –221 –198 –88 –77 –50 –222
Nuclear 49 51 68 53 62 40
Average ALL
b –13 –8 32 14 19 –21
MD and PA
c     
Gas     
     
     
     
   
–4 14 27 11 21 6
Coal 39 46 54 50 59 59
Nuclear 35 47 56 48 52 55
Average ALL
b 14 24 33 23 28 25
Model  MA20Dagig MADagig MAHeg MAHee MAHeg_coal MADeg_coal
a Coal-fired generation counts twice. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity including types not listed separately. 
c Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region.  
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Table 15. Overview of Constrained Cases 
Eligibility:          Emitters Emitters
Basis:    Historic generation   Historic generation
Constraints:  None  Higher gas price  Higher gas price & transmission limits 
RGGI region  Standard baseline   Constrained baseline  
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $103.4 $112.2 $108.4 $112.7
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  393 345 386 347
Coal 73 50 74 49
Gas 130 96 97 97
Nuclear 107 108 108 108
Renewable 34 47 37 47
New capacity
a (GW)  28 30 28 30
Gas 23 22 22 22
Renewable 5 8 6 8
CO2 price (1999$/ton)  n/a $20.6 $0.0 $20.5
Emissions 
  CO2 (million tons)  147 99 149 100
  NOx (thousand tons)  118 76 115 77
  SO2 (thousand tons)  193 127 250 130
  Mercury (tons)  1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8
Rest of nation
b 
Average electricity price (1999$/MWh)  $66.6 $67.5 $67.2 $67.5
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  4,847 4,867 4,838 4,864
CO2 reduction for nation cumulative (2008–2025)  n/a n/a
c n/a 238
d
Model  BL HegGhi BLT10Ghi HegT10Ghi
a Numbers may not sum because of rounding. 
bIncludes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
cNo baseline was run for only high natural gas prices. 
d Compared with Constrained Baseline. 
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Table 16. Change in Economic Surplus from Standard Baseline (Social Cost), 2025, 
Constrained Cases (billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:  Emitters   Emitters 
Basis:  Historic generation   Historic generation 
Constraints:  Higher gas price  Higher gas price & electricity transmission limits
RGGI region  Standard baseline  Constrained baseline   
Consumers –3.8 –2.2 –4.0
Producers 2.4 1.0 2.6
CO2 revenue  0.0 0.0 0.0
SUBTOTAL
a –1.5 –1.2 –1.5
Rest of nation
b 
Consumers –4.1 –2.4 –4.0
Producers 2.8 0.9 2.9
SUBTOTAL
a –1.9 –2.3 –1.7
National TOTAL
a  –3.4 –3.5 –3.2
Model  HegGhi BLT10Ghi HegT10Ghi
a Numbers may not add because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
bIncludes the MAAC region of NERC outside the RGGI region. 
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Table 17. Net Present Value of Generation Assets in Baseline, Changes from Standard 
Baseline for Constrained Cases (1999$/kW) 
Eligibility:   Emitters    Emitters 
Basis:   Historic 
generation 
 Historic  generation 
Constraints:    Higher gas price  Higher gas price &electricity transmission 
limits 
RGGI region  Standard 
baseline    Constrained baseline   
Gas –273  47 1  54
Coal 434  147 154  156
Nuclear 611  208 146  206
Average 
ALL
b  164 125 76  124
MD and PA
a     
Gas –255  –14 –13  –11
Coal 364  161 78  145
Nuclear 653  173 87  157
Average 
ALL
b  229 94 47  77
Model  BL HegGhi BLT10Ghi  HegT10Ghi
a Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity including types not listed separately. 
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Table 18. Overview of RPS Case 
Eligibility:   Emitters    Emitters 




Constraints:  None  None  RPS   RPS  
RGGI region  Standard 
baseline    RPS 
baseline   
Average electricity price 
(1999$/MWh)  $103.4 $107.1 $103.3 $106.0
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  393 348 387  350
Coal 73 48 70  55
Gas 130 115 107  97
Nuclear 107 108 107  107
Renewable 34 40 57  54
New capacity
a (GW)  28 31 31  33
Gas 23 24 21  23
Renewable 5 6 10  9
CO2 price (1999$/ton)  n/a $18.1 n/a  $15.6
Emissions  
  CO2 (million tons)  147 100 133  99
  NOx (thousand tons)  118 70 110  76
  SO2 (thousand tons)  193 101 190  120
  Mercury (tons)  1.2 0.8 1.2  0.9
Rest of nation
b   
Average electricity price 
(1999$/MWh)  $66.6 $66.8 66.7 66.9
TOTAL generation (billion kWh)  4,847 4,885 4,844  4,875
CO2 reduction for nation cumulative 
(2008–2025)  n/a 201 n/a 141
c
Model  BL Heg RPS_BL Heg_RPS
a Numbers may not sum because of rounding. 
bIncludes Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within MAAC outside the RGGI region. 
cCompared with RPS Baseline. 
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Table 19. Change in Economic Surplus from Standard Baseline (Social Cost), 2025, RPS 
Case (billion 1999$) 
Eligibility:  Emitters  Emitters 
Basis:  Historic generation   Historic generation 
Constraints: None  RPS  RPS 
RGGI region    RPS Baseline  
Consumers –1.6 0.0 –1.1 
Producers 1.2 0.6 1.3 






b   
Consumers –1.2 –0.7 –1.4 






a  –0.3 –0.9 –1.0 
Model  Heg RPS_BL Heg_RPS 
a Numbers may not add because of other categories including change in tax credit costs. 
bIncludes MAAC outside RGGI. 
cSubtotal includes cost of federal tax credits. 
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Table 20. Net Present Value of Generation Assets in Baseline, Changes from Standard 
Baseline for RPS Case (1999$/kW) 
Eligibility:   Emitters    Emitters 
Basis:    Historic generation   Historic generation
Constraints: None  None  RPS  RPS 
RGGI region  Standard baseline   RPS baseline  
Gas –273 54 –18 27
Coal 434 8 3 –20
Nuclear 611 67 –17 28
Average ALL
b 164 60 13 50
MD and PA
a 
Gas –255 6 26 7
Coal 364 50 0 26
Nuclear 653 51 –9 26
Average ALL**  229 23 14 20
Model  BL Heg RPS_BL Heg_RPS
a Maryland and portion of Pennsylvania within the MAAC region of the NERC and outside the RGGI region. 
b ALL includes all generation capacity, including types not listed separately. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Going-Forward Costs for Existing Coal and New Gas Under Dynamic and 
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Notes: Hg = mercury; O&M = operations and maintenance. 
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Updating Historic Mixed  Auction 
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Updating Historic Mixed Auction
 
CS = consumer surplus, PS = producer surplus, CO2 Rev = CO2 revenue, TS = total surplus. 
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